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If any endeavor is presently out of fashion, it is certainly that of
trying to reduce the law of tort to a single theory. The quest for an
integrating principle has been called a pursuit of futility.' Modern
scholars have lost the illusion that fault, or duty, could be a common
element in all torts. Even the current idea that enterprises, or persons
who engage in abnormally dangerous activities, or own or operate
dangerous instrumentalities should bear an absolute liability by reason
of their risk bearing capacity has been subjected to careful scrutiny
by Professor Clarence Morris and found to have only qualified value.2
Yet, it seems worthwhile to consider a theory advanced by the
French jurist, Professor Boris Starck. Although this theory received
little attention when it was first expressed, in 1947, in a 500-page
thesis,3 it presently appears to exert more attraction, perhaps because
of the author's considerable influence on his students at the University
of Paris. It has also strongly inspired the provisions relating to torts
in the Code of Obligations of the Malagasy Republic. 4 This theory, it
is true, does not pretend to reduce tort law to a single idea such as
fault, duty, risk, or damage. In fact it is fundamentally dualist. On
the other hand, it departs from the contemporary trend of pragmatism,
in that it ventures to build the law of tort on two pillars-fault and
guaranty-and to define by rational arguments the fields which should
be covered by each of those notions.
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The purpose of this Article will be to present Professor Starck's
theory and try to assess its value.
I. THE THEORY
Professor Starck's theory is based upon a distinction between the
various injuries to which a citizen is subjected in society.
There are many injuries against which, in principle, the law does
not afford any protection, for the simple reason that they are the
natural and unavoidable consequences of the exercise of rights by
other citizens, or more commonly of the enjoyment of individual free-
doms.5 Thus, one usually is at liberty to open a new business, which
will compete with existing ones. One is at liberty to try to obtain a
certain position or to marry a certain girl (or boy), thus depriving
others of obtaining the position or the coveted person. One is at liberty
to bring a lawsuit against someone else, thus obliging him to all the
costs and worries of a defense. One is at liberty to publish an unfavor-
able judgment on a play, a book, a piece of art, a legal or philosophical
theory, or a product-notwithstanding the wound to the author's or
producer's pride and, perhaps, important financial consequences. One
is in principle at liberty to advocate a strike or to engage in a strike.
The citizen has no automatic protection, no guaranty, against the
damages resulting in such cases from the exercise by his fellow citizens
of their individual freedoms. Neither is he, however, unconditionally
exposed to these damages. 6 He may expect his fellow citizens to exer-
cise their freedoms fairly, to abide by "the rules of the game" of the
society. In the case of unfair competition, for instance, he will be able
to claim damages. Thus, in the fields of damages presently considered,
fault appears as the social regulator of activities. "On vit toujours aux
ddpens d'autrui", wrote Jean-Paul Sartre. I must bear the harm caused
me by my competitors or my neighb6rs unless they have committed
a fault, that is, not behaved as good citizens, conscious of their social
duties and mindful of others' equal rights and freedoms.
The situation is different when someone suffers a physical injury
to his person or to his property.' His fellow citizens are not free to kill
him, nor to destroy or damage his tangible property. Against such
harms the law should provide automatic protection. Society should
guaranty to every citizen his personal integrity, the integrity of his
spouse and relatives, and the integrity of his tangible property. And
when it has failed to protect him, it should at least assure him auto-
5 OBLiGATIONS, supra note 3, no. 66.
6Id. no. 72.
7Id. no. 67.
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matic compensation from the person who caused him the injury. It is
true that such injuries often occur, not by a deliberate action of the
tortfeasor or through any fault, but as a result of statistically unavoid-
able error, or sometimes even by pure misfortune. No one can claim
that he will drive his car without ever causing injury to someone else.
Yet one is free to drive a car in accordance with the regulations. The
situation however is basically different from the one considered in the
preceding paragraph. Unless a fault has been committed, every citizen
must suffer the harm which necessarily flows from his fellow citizens'
exercise of their freedoms. But he does not have to suffer without
compensation personal injury or property damage caused by another,
even if the other person was acting legally and without fault. The
simple idea that everyone should be fully protected from others' inter-
ference in his life, limb, and tangible property (and in the life and
health of his spouse and relatives) could replace personal liability with
fault in most of its application, as well as liability for injury by ani-
mals and for inanimate objects under one's control.s Only some excep-
tions would need to be provided for the few persons who have a right
to cause physical harms: the surgeon, the executioner, the boxer, the
citizen who acts in self-defense or in defense of someone else.
Before any appraisal is made of Professor Starck's theory, its
originality should be underlined. The traditional approach to the law
of tort, at least since the nineteenth century (the past is more ob-
scure' ° ) was from the point of view of the author of the damage: "The
general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where
it falls, and this principle is not affected by the fact that a human
being is the instrument of misfortune."" More recently, a current of
thought has questioned this approach and, with variations sometimes
significant, suggested that the victim of an injury be indemnified, un-
less there were a reason to let him bear the loss. Professor Starck's
originality is to admit that both approaches are valid in certain fields
and to determine their legitimate domains by distinguishing not be-
tween the various acts, activities, behaviors, or instruments which
may give rise to an injury, but between the various harms which may
8 The endeavor bears some similarity to a more recent one: Calabresi & Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 H av.
L. REv. 1089 (1972).
9 OBLIGATIoNS, supra note 3, no. 68.
10 See Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of Torts, in THE
ORIGIN AD DEVELOPAET or TE NEGLIGENC E ACToN 1 (Dep't of Transp., Automobile
Insurance and Compensation Study 1972); James, Analysis of the Origin and Develop-
ment of the Negligence Action, in id. 35; Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault
in Tort Law, in id. 51; Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HEARv. L. Rxv.
537, 539 (1972).
11 O.W. HOLMEs, TnE COmmON LAW 94 (1881).
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be suffered. Professor Starck certainly belongs to a modern stream of
thought, but he concedes the validity of the traditional one for non-
physical harms, particularly harms to economic and moral interests
(for example, honor, privacy, and freedom). Even within the field
covered by the guaranty principle, he would suggest an increased
liability in case of fault, for reasons of justice and deterrence, since
the criminal law can intervene only in exceptional cases."
II. A TENTATIVE APPRAISAL
Professor Starck's theory is attractive in many respects. It is
based on relatively simple, but sound, ideas. Its main value may be
that (while being to a certain extent a return to the law of trespass)
it gives legal expression to what is certainly a very deep and general
yearning in the contemporary world: man's aspiration to security. The
"right to social security," expressed by a number of constitutions and
international agreements,13 is itself a particular expression of a more
general expectation. In an affluent society, it is hard to admit that a
citizen may be left without support when he has been injured by the
act or activity, even non-faulty, of another or by a thing belonging to
another.' 4 It is common knowledge in most countries that juries, and
even professional judges, do their best to indemnify injured parties
through an extension of the concepts of fault or negligence. The dis-
tortion of the law due to this desire to indemnify the injured is seen
in France where 95 percent of the pedestrians injured in traffic acci-
dents receive compensation even though research has shown that 70
percent were solely victims of their own fault.' 5 It is true that the
courts sometimes recognize fault on the part of the victim in the acci-
dent and theoretically apportion the liability on the basis of compara-
tive negligence. When this is the case, however, the physician reporting
to the court, and the court itself, often successively overestimate the
injuries, the result being that someone solely the victim of his own
fault receives more than the deserved compensation for the harm
12 OBLIGATIONS, supra note 3, nos. 77-80.
13 See JJ. DnE'YRoux, ScUR.rrL SocIALE nos. 37-44 (4th ed. 1971).
14 An experience of the present writer a few years ago is illustrative. He was giving
oral examinations to students raised by one of his colleagues in the cult of the fault
principle. All the students expressed, most of them certainly sincerely, the feeling that
the fault principle was a necessary foundation of society. Then a concrete case was put
to them. A storm of exceptional violence had uprooted trees which had: (a) injured
a passing pedestrian; (b) flattened a parked car. No student had any hesitation on the
solution: they all favored compensation of the harm, even though the French "liability
for damage caused by things" is set aside in the case of vis major, and even though it
was stipulated for hypothesis (b) that the damage was only to an inanimate object
which was currently covered by insurance.
"5 Tunc, Traffic Accident Compensation: Law and Proposals ch. 14, § 78, in 11
im=ATiONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA o ComPARAmn LAw (1971).
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suffered. It is apparent, therefore, that, as Professor Starck asserts,
"The idea of guaranty responds to the modern world's need for
security."'
16
It should be pointed out that Professor Starck's theory would
protect the victims of accidental harm'7 and would provide the needed
rationale for the revolution in tort law which has occurred in this
area.18 Furthermore, the fact that liability insurance coverage has al-
ready been extended to this area may well ease the burden of bearing
liability. 9
Moreover, this theory is probably a much less radical departure
from the existing law than it initially appears.21 Precisely because of
the common aspiration to security and of the response of the judiciary
to that aspiration, a rule of law recognizing the idea that every en-
croachment on the integrity of persons and properties should be com-
pensated, except in a few specific cases, would probably greatly
simplify the administration of tort law, while nevertheless amounting
to little more than a restatement of the law as it is, or as it tends to be.
While Professor Starck's theory possesses unquestionable merit,
it also has definite limitations. From a theoretical point of view, the
distinction between the various harms to which the citizen is exposed
has a dubious foundation. Why should one be protected in his body
and not in his honor? in the grief that he feels when he loses a relative
and not in the grief that he feels when the play on which he has
worked for years is destroyed by an incompetent critic? Why should
he be protected in his tangible property but not in the value of busi-
16 OBLIGATIONS, supra note 3, no. 74.
The theory also seems to conform to moral requisites. A Catholic priest, De Naurois,
with a double education as jurist and moralist, has reached conclusions parallel to those
of Professor Starck. He contends that commutative justice obliges anyone who has
infringed another's right, whether by fault or not, to compensate the harm done to
him. The mere interests resulting from freedoms (for instance, the interest of a
trader in keeping his customers) also deserve protection. The protection of mere
interests, however, is necessarily weaker than that accorded to rights, because every-
one's freedom competes with the freedom of the others. Thus, De Naurois, like
Professor Starck, considers that a certain field, defined from the point of view of
the victim, is governed by a guaranty principle, while another one is governed by the
fault principle. Even the delinitations of the respective fields of guaranty and fault
are approximately the same. De Naurois, Juristes et Moralistes en Prisence des Obliga-
tions Interpersonnelles de Justice, 1963 NouvELLE REVUE THEoLOGIQUE 598; De Naurois,
L'Obligation de R~parer le Dommage Ca6sd Injustemnent (Responsabilit Dilictuelle du
Fait Personnel): Essai de Confrontation des Thories Juridique et Morale, in MELANGEs
O=RTS A J'As. BRETaa DE LA GREsSAYE 545 (1967).
17 There has been a substantial amount of writing on this question. See P. ATny ,
AccmENTs, COxPENSATON AND Tnm LAW (1970); G. CAuABRmsi, THE CosTs oF AcCmmETs
(1970); T. IsoN, Tim FoRENsIc LOrrERY (1967); R. KEEToN, VENTUPING To Do JUSTCE
(1969) ; James, supra note 1, at 325-33; Jolowicz, Liability for Accidents, 1968 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 5o.
18 OBLIGATIONS, supra note 3, no. 73.
'9 Id. nos. 82-86.
20 Id. no. 70.
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ness? The author answers that economic and moral harms are bound
to occur as a result of the conflict of competing activities.21 But, is it
not also true that accidents are bound to occur as a result of driving,
or of industrial activities? The difference, of course, is that a business
activity necessarily and permanently harms competitors, while driving
only creates a permanent risk of injuries. The difference is thin. Fur-
thermore, a competent and impartial critic is bound to harm a number
of the authors whose works he reviews, and thus may be compared to a
driver, who is statistically bound to occasion accidents. This is not to
say that the distinction is unsound, but only to show that its rationale
has not been clearly explained 2
Furthermore, in practice the distinction is not always clear-
perhaps precisely because its foundation is uncertain. Problems of
defining the limits of each field frequently arise. One may wonder, for
instance, where to place nervous shock (and the miscarriage following
it) or the strain and nervous illness caused by a persistent or recurrent
noise. One may ask the same question about harms caused by drugs,
cigarettes, or irradiations. Professor Starck, to whom these questions
have been submitted, considers a nervous shock a physical damage.
Harms suffered as a result of noise, however, would entail guaranty
only if the noise were excessive23-a departure from the fault prin-
ciple. Conversely, producers of cigarettes or drugs dangerous even
when taken according to normal prescriptions, should guaranty the
harms suffered. These may be valid answers, but if the courts were to
attempt to apply the theory, new questions would continually arise
and the courts would be forced to strain to provide coherent answers.
The determination of the person charged with the guaranty is
another point which remains obscure in many cases. If a bottle of car-
bonated beverage explodes in the hands of the customer in a self-
service store and injures another customer, Professor Starck's theory
teaches us that the latter should be indemnified, but does not say by
whom: by the first customer? by the store owner? by the producer of
the beverage? by the producer of the bottle? Of course, the question
could be decided solely on the risk bearing capacity of the parties in-
volved. 4 This answer, however, has no connection with Professor
Starck's theory and reveals that the theory cannot be considered a
comprehensive one.
21 Id. nos. 69, 71.
22 Cf. Kayser, Les Droits de la Personnalift: Aspects Thoriques et Pratiques, 70
REv. TRiu. DR. CIv. 445, 456-57 (1971).
2 3 See EssAl, supra note 3, at 162-95.
2 4 See C. MoRms, ToRTS 246-53 (1953); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk
Bearing Capacity, 61 YAL, L.J. 1172 (1952).
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Similarly, in creating an absolute liability, the theory ignores the
merits of property insurance.25 These merits are such that the main
feature of the recent traffic accident laws and proposals is to build the
compensation system as much as possible around one-party insurance,
that is, insurance for one's own injuries.26
Nor does the theory make any provision for avoiding the hard-
ship to the person charged with the guaranty when he is not covered
by liability insurance, as in a situation where liability insurance is not
customary. Unless the conclusion is accepted that in the modern world
every reasonable man should obtain comprehensive liability insurance
coverage, a general absolute liability would require the courts to al-
ways consider the possibility of mitigating damages27-- a possibility
which runs somewhat contrary to the idea of full guaranty.
Finally, the writers and commissions which favor coverage for all
accidental losses28 would point out that Professor Starck's theory does
not guaranty compensation in most cases of home accidents. The
theory would require indemnification only when some instrumentality
has been found defective. Obviously, then, one would not be entitled
to recover against the producer of his bathtub because he slipped in
it and injured himself. Of course, it may be that the quest for complete
security is an illusion. But there is certainly a contradiction in basing
a theory on the idea of security but failing to provide compensation
for an important class of accidental injuries.29
Thus, Professor Starck's theory presents certain weaknesses
which would make one reluctant to advocate its adoption, even in a
country like France, where tort law is codified in five articles of the
Civil Codel One would, at least, want to wait and observe its efficacy
in the Malagasy Republic where, subject to some modifications, it is
being applied. The theory would, further, probably encounter great
skepticism in the United States, where doctrinal writing on tort law
has attained a high degree of sophistication, and where the interplay
of tort law and economics has been explored at some depth; it would
25 For a discussion of the significance of property insurance to risk bearing theory,
see C. Moiuus, ToRTs 250-51 (1953).
26 See Tunc, supra note 15, § 197.
27 For a comparative study of the mitigation of damages, see Honor6, Causation
and Remoteness of Damages Ch. 7, § 101, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ComuARATw LAw (1971); StoU, Consequences of Liability: Remedies Ch. 8, §§ 155-74,
in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA oF ComPARATE LAW (1972).
28 E.g., T. IsoN, supra note 17; RoYAL CoamrissoN oF INQujiY, COMPENSATION FOR
PERSONAL IwJURy 3N NEw ZEALAND (1967); SELECt COMMITTEE ON COmENsATION FOR
PERSONAL INJURY n NEW ZEALAND, REPORT (1970); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence
Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967).
29 Although traffic accidents cause twice as many deaths per year as home accidents
(56,400 vs. 27,000 in 1969), the proportion is reversed for disabling injuries (2,000,000
vs. 4,100,000 in 1969). NATIONAL SAPETY CouNcn, ACcmENT FACTS 3 (1970 ed.).
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appear as a typically French logical construction with little possible
relation to life.
In the present writer's opinion, such a judgment would not, how-
ever, be entirely justified. Professor Starck's theory deserves to be
viewed, first, as a bold and somewhat futuristic restatement of the law
from a bird's eye view3° and, second, as a theory, perhaps even as a
philosophy-a set of rules which, while not appropriate for embodi-
ment in the statutory law of an industrialized nation, can and should
nevertheless inspire the development of the law of tort, even if the
latter needs more refinement. Considered as such, Professor Starck's
ideas are certainly a valuable contribution to the modernization of the
law.
30 Cf. OBLiAnioNs, supra note 3, nos. 88-89.
